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ABSTRACT 
 
Buying clubs arise when a group of individuals convenes to use their collective 
purchasing power to obtain bulk quantities of items, in this case food, at per-unit prices 
lower than offered by traditional grocers, or specialty items that are difficult to find. As 
cooperatively-structured groups, it is hypothesized that they function on the core 
principles of cooperation, reciprocity and other prosocial behaviors which support the 
benefit of the group rather than individual benefit. This research aims to test this by 
observing, identifying and analyzing behaviors which are instrumental in the success or 
failure of buying clubs, and by measuring cooperation empirically with two experimental 
economic games. I am interested in the relationship between institutions and cooperation, 
and one way to examine this is through the work of Elinor Ostrom. We examined the 
influence of institutional factors including cooperation, measures of participation, and 
successful collective action to see if they were greater among members of buying clubs 
with more rules corresponding to Elinor Ostrom’s institutional design principles. While 
no strong association between the design principles and buying club cooperation was 
found, participants in this survey donated nearly twice the expected percent of their 
endowment in each experimental game, suggesting that the buying club members in this 
study are more cooperative on average than members of the general public. 
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CHAPTER I 
1.1 – Background 
 
Living on a finite planet, humans are fundamentally challenged to allocate and 
manage natural resources for long term survival. Scarcity, a product of many elements 
including overexploitation of resources and social inequality, has driven many societies 
throughout history to collapse. Classic examples of this include the Rapa Nui of Easter 
Island and Norse Greenland societies, who squandered their resources by failing to 
manage them for long term sustainability (Diamond, 2005). The management of natural 
resources is closely connected to the ways societies manage their human population. This 
is demonstrated throughout history in comparing societies that succeed to those that 
collapse, often due to the failure of institutions to create inclusive, participatory economic 
conditions for their citizens. A classic example of this is the case of North and South 
Korea, sister nations with an enormous socioeconomic disparity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012).  
Despite a pattern of resource depletion and related societal demise throughout 
human history, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that many individuals began to 
recognize that the life-sustaining properties of the Earth are limited, and that economic 
and material growth cannot continue infinitely (Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 1972). 
Although the issue of environmental limits leading to human crisis has been brought to 
the attention of world leaders, serious action has yet to be taken on a large scale, and 
humans continue to face sustainability problems around the world. Former US President 
Barack Obama has cited climate change as the greatest threat to the future of the world. 
 2 
The Amazon rainforest, one of the most productive, diverse and ecologically sensitive 
ecosystems on the Earth as well as a vital carbon sink, lost 7,989 square kilometers of 
forest, roughly the size of Connecticut state, to clear cutting from 2015-2016, a 29% 
increase from the previous year (National Institute for Space Research, 2016). With the 
supply of arable land, fresh water, and clean air diminishing, the growing need for 
solutions has launched the social sciences into new territory. While economists have 
traditionally concerned themselves with the mechanisms of uninhibited growth, rooted in 
neoclassical economic theory, new movements have formed that take into account the 
limits and value of the natural world and the human relationship to it; these include the 
sub-disciplines of resource, behavioral, and ecological economics, which provide useful 
frameworks for evaluating sustainability issues and crafting solutions that will be needed 
in the coming decades as we face the ever greater global environmental challenges. 
Scholars of various disciplines have contributed to a body of literature that 
focuses on the issue of natural resource management. Garrett Hardin’s 1968 paper The 
Tragedy of the Commons was influential in that it helped the scientific community see 
that resource management is often a social dilemma, where the optimal choice for an 
individual runs counter to the choice that most benefits the group (Archetti, 2012). 
Hardin describes the challenge of sustainability through the example of a group of 
herders who graze their animals on an open pasture. Because each individual seeks to 
maximize her gain in this system, she will continue to add animals to the commons, 
causing the commons to be overgrazed. Hardin suggested that to avoid a tragedy of the 
commons requires either government regulation or privatization of resources. This 
solution was expanded by economist Elinor Ostrom, who found that solutions to this 
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dilemma often emerge and evolve organically within collective action institutions. 
Ostrom demonstrated that common-pool resources can be managed successfully without 
falling victim to the tragedy of the commons. 
Ostrom dedicated her life to the study of groups of people who manage common-
pool resources (CPRs), both successfully and unsuccessfully. What she found 
revolutionized the field of sustainability and earned her a Nobel-memorial Prize in 
economics. Ostrom’s work outlines a series of eight institutional design principles 
commonly employed by long-enduring CPR institutions that address the many challenges 
posed by the tragedy of the commons. These principles include: 1. Clearly defined 
barriers to entry as well as physical boundaries of the CPR; 2. A congruence between 
appropriation and provision of rules and local conditions; 3. Collective-choice 
arrangements; 4. Monitoring; 5. Graduated sanctions; 6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms; 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize; and 8. Nested enterprises (Ostrom, 1990). 
Ostrom’s influence has spread beyond the realm of common pool resource management 
to fields such as behavioral economics. Importantly, new literature in this discipline has 
indicated that Ostrom’s principles can be applied to many different types of groups, 
beyond those managing natural resources, making them a useful lens through which to 
study and understand group decisionmaking in light of sustainability challenges 
(Anderies & Janssen, 2013).  Other scholars have argued the design principles may be 
applied to nearly any type of group to improve their long-term collective success 
(Wilson, Elinor Ostrom, & Michael E. Cox, 2013). The present research builds on the 
work of Ostrom, Wilson and other economists, which has suggested that cooperation is a 
key factor in solving sustainability challenges. This study uses those principles in 
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confluence with the role of cooperation as a framework to study the organizational 
structure and social impacts of food buying clubs. Buying clubs have been selected 
precisely because, along with other local food institutions, they are believed to require 
elevated levels of cooperation to emerge and persist over time (Tremblay & Waring, 
2015).  
 
1.2 –  Buying Clubs and the Cooperative Structure 
 
Food systems are a major focus of sustainability science because they appropriate 
a vast amount of energy and natural resources and produce vital sustenance for human 
life. The dominant industrial food system in the United States, while providing an 
abundant supply of calorie dense and inexpensive foods, poses many problems for 
environmental, health, and animal welfare concerns (Pollan, 2006). Cooperation and 
collective action have been identified as key components of sustainable food systems, 
which offer a more community-based approach to solving issues related to food justice 
(Ikerd, 2012). They allow for individuals to form connections with growers and make 
educated choices about the foods they consume, giving them greater influence over the 
system as a whole.   
Cooperative food systems, including organizations such as food hubs, farmers’ 
markets, community-supported agriculture (CSA), buying clubs and food co-ops, 
typically operate on the principles of participatory democracy, solidarity and reciprocity 
(Renting, Schermer, & Rossi, 2012). Such organizations allow consumers to actively 
participate in and establish more democratic control over the food system. When 
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consumers move away from the mainstream marketplace to join a buying club or 
purchase a CSA share, new channels of consumption are opened and freedom of choice is 
strengthened. Additionally, these cooperatives provide social and collective capital and a 
common food ethic that brings members of different backgrounds together (Little, Maye, 
& Ilbery, 2010). Further, the cooperative organizational structure has been shown to 
serve as a catalyst of socioeconomic transformation, particularly in rural parts of the 
world, where agriculture is the main economic driver. In India, for example, dairy and 
sugar cooperatives provide employment and financial safety nets to farmers who once 
relied on money lenders for assistance. In addition, these cooperatives have established 
facilities like schools, hospitals, and stores in rural areas that have aided in the economic 
development of impoverished communities throughout the country (Anandaram & 
Dubhashi, 1999). Because the cooperative model provides benefits that go beyond the 
food system, understanding cooperatives is important for the field of sustainability and to 
the study of collective action problems in general (Anderson, Brushett, Gray, & Renting, 
2014). Here I report on a study of the most informal of food cooperatives, the food 
buying club. 
Buying clubs are organizations that arise when a group of individuals convenes to 
use their collective buying power to purchase bulk quantities of items, in this case food, 
at per-unit prices lower than offered by traditional grocers or specialty items they cannot 
get elsewhere. Buying clubs represent a form of marketplace exit, in which groups of 
individuals decide to purchase items outside of the mainstream business environment in 
order to exert more control over the goods and services they desire (Herrmann, 1993). 
These groups cut out the retail middleman by ordering items directly from wholesalers, 
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and sometimes local farmers, often saving members money and providing them more 
freedom of choice. Due to its unique structure, this model may rely more heavily on 
coordination, reciprocity and cooperation than other, more traditional market venues, an 
idea which is tested by this thesis. These features are often exhibited in the purchasing 
behaviors of buying club members, particularly when individuals work together to create 
split orders. Splits occur when two or more members contribute their funds toward the 
purchase of a larger item to be divided and redistributed after the order has been received. 
The size and frequency of split orders is a useful metric that can be used to compare 
levels of cooperation across buying clubs, because they are a product of individuals 
working together toward a common goal and often making a sacrifice to help others. For 
instance, a buying club member may choose to help others purchase certain items that 
they do not particularly care for, or that they would not choose to purchase on their own, 
thus demonstrating the ability to cooperate with others. Because economic studies focus 
largely on competition rather than cooperation, the social structure of food buying clubs 
provides a unique and interesting model for the study of prosocial behavior in an 
economic context. This project investigates whether and to what extent the social 
organization of food buying clubs relates to the institutional principles designed by 
Ostrom, and how those institutional factors impact measures of cooperation among 
members.   
Successful buying clubs may eventually grow large enough to transition to food 
cooperatives, or “food co-ops.” While buying clubs typically consist of informal group 
meetings in person or online, co-ops are physical stores which market and sell products 
directly to consumers while retaining some group-level attributes similar to buying clubs, 
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including formal membership, collective governance, and work-sharing. Co-ops possess a 
certain value when compared to conventional grocers, in that they are more committed to 
their communities, consumer preference, and support for local producers. Many co-ops 
play a critical role in ensuring the viability of these growers, who rely on the co-op to 
provide a fair price and other services. Co-ops are valued community institutions, and are 
key components in the strength of local food networks, along with other organizations 
including CSAs and farmers’ markets (Katchova, 2011). Many food co-ops have been 
founded on the seven original co-op principles established in Rochdale, England in 1844. 
These principles include “open membership, democratic control, distribution of surplus in 
proportion to trade, payment of limited interest on capital, political and religious 
neutrality, cash trading and promotion of education” (Thompson, 1994). Today, the 
principles have been modified to include concern for community, autonomy and 
independence, and cooperation among cooperatives. Though these principles provide the 
foundation for co-ops, similar concerns play an important role in the organizational 
structure of buying clubs.  
 Buying clubs and co-ops are founded for many reasons that expand beyond 
economic climate to include both political and social movements. Cooperatives operating 
in a capitalist economy are faced with many economic disincentives, and are fueled by a 
number of different social and economic factors. Cooperatives generally emerge as a 
product of one of three phenomena: anti-corporate sentiment within a community, the 
perception of corporations posing a potential threat to a community, or the presence of 
other infrastructure within a community that supports the cooperative ideology (Boone, 
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2014). In general, the diffusion of corporate entities can create a reaction among 
community members that may support the formation of cooperatives.  
Buying clubs and co-ops have appeared in two different waves in recent history. 
First introduced to the US mainstream market in the 1930s, co-ops offered lower-than-
retail prices at a time when consumers sought exactly that. In the ‘30s, cooperatives 
diverted a significant volume of business away from traditional retailers (Taylor, 1937).  
World War II signaled the end of the great depression, and with it a period of dormancy 
for cooperatives. In the 1970’s another wave of co-op interest coincided with the back to 
the land movement, when demand spread for natural and alternative foodstuffs. Recently, 
with the growing trend of organic, non-GMO and locally produced foods, co-ops are 
experiencing a third wave of popularity. In the US in 2014, there were between 300-350 
member-owned food co-ops, providing over 850,000 jobs and $74 billion in annual 
wages and generating $500 billion in revenue annually (Valigra, 2014). The number of 
consumer food co-ops in Maine has been on the rise, which nearly doubled to 11 in 2014. 
Part of the reason for this trend is the increasing demand for local food seen in the 
growing value of crop and livestock in the state, which rose by 24% from 2007-2012, and 
the number of farms which increased 13.6% in this five-year period (Valigra, 2014). The 
increasing popularity of cooperative purchasing groups makes co-ops ripe for 
investigation with many new trends to be studied and analyzed. Because they are making 
a notable impact in Maine, they are increasingly relevant to the field of sustainable food 
systems.   
Food co-ops generally operate at a scale much smaller than conventional retailers. 
Many cooperatives have modeled their business around E. F. Schumacher’s concept of 
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“small is beautiful,” which helped inspire the local food movement by arguing for a 
smaller-scale, more sustainable economy that suits human need without creating 
excessive waste. Small-scale co-ops are advantageous in many ways, and can employ 
strategies not feasible for other businesses, including low-cost labor in the form of 
volunteer programs that offer discounts, small wages or other benefits. Schumacher’s 
“small is beautiful” principle applies well to the structure of buying clubs. However, 
small scale operations face the challenge of a difficult position in economies of scale. 
Other scholars argue that, in order for cooperatives to be successful and competitive in 
the long term, they must face eventual growth to compete with other businesses. Co-ops 
that remain averse to this growth may be disadvantaged in the event of increased 
competition or similar challenges in the business climate .  
Cooperation in buying clubs can be revealed through the frequency of split orders 
– the bulk quantities items purchased with pooled funds and then split up among smaller 
groups within the club, as explained previously. However, cooperation can also be 
exhibited in other activities, such as volunteerism. Volunteer efforts are a central aspect 
of buying clubs and cooperatives, as many would not survive without a strong volunteer 
base.  
Like cooperatives, buying clubs rely nearly exclusively on volunteer labor. The 
relationship between an organization and its volunteers is a symbiotic one, requiring 
attention and development over time (Hibbert, Piacentini, & Al Dajani, 2003). Asking or 
requiring individuals to donate their time and energy for the benefit of the group is a 
classic example of a social dilemma, one that is often responsible for the failure of 
groups. Cooperation is therefore a key factor in the ability of food buying clubs and co-
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ops to successfully recruit volunteer labor and to sustain themselves. This can become a 
true challenge when such groups increase in size, which increases the labor requirements 
and reduces social returns to individuals. Thus, organizations that require unpaid labor to 
sustain themselves often struggle to maintain participation. 
Economic game theory, a key component of this study, can be used to assess the 
various motivations for volunteering. While volunteerism has long been viewed as a form 
of unreciprocated altruism, random altruism may not be supported by evolution. 
Reciprocal altruism, or the expectation of some benefit in return for the generous act, 
may be more common in long-lived organizations. Prosociality, a set of behaviors which 
support group function over individual benefit, has been shown to correlate strongly with 
personal and organizational reward (Murnighan, Kim, & Metzger, 1993). However, other 
factors may influence altruism among volunteers. For example, volunteers are more 
likely to exhibit altruistic behaviors when they feel that the group is an important part of 
their identity (Meisenbach & Kramer, 2014) or if they are part of a collectivist culture in 
which no social contract is needed and altruism is the norm (Henrich et al., 2004). Here 
we addressed these elements of volunteerism in a number of questions in the buying club 
survey (see Appendix A). 
     
1.3 – Economic Game Theory  
 
We used experimental economic games to measure cooperation among the buying 
clubs in the study population. Experimental economic games have been identified by 
researchers as a useful tool for measuring prosocial behaviors, including “trust, 
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cooperation, and reciprocity” among people within organizations (Waring, Goff, 
McGuire, Moore, & Sullivan, 2014). We employ two economic experiments (or games) 
in this study: the dictator game and the public goods game. Although both games focus 
on cooperation, they are slightly different.  
The dictator game provides a measure of altruism, or unenforced fairness among 
individuals (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). The 
pure dictator game separates participants into two categories, dictators and recipients. 
Dictators are presented with an initial monetary endowment and asked to decide whether 
they wish to keep all of the endowment or donate any portion of it to an anonymous 
recipient. In the current study, subjects were given both dictator and recipient status. 
However, survey participants were not told until the end of the game that they would 
receive whatever portion of their endowment they wish to keep, plus whatever the 
previous player donated to them. If an individual chooses to act in her own self-interest, 
she will keep 100% of her endowment and donate zero percent to the next player. This 
choice provides the most immediate and guaranteed benefit, but it creates a social 
dilemma around unequal sharing.  
 Generally, donations in dictator game giving are not distributed normally, as a 
significant fraction of dictators choose to give nothing, and there is a large fraction at the 
equal split. Additionally, dictator game outcomes vary across cultures, which have 
different baseline levels of altruism and cooperation which affect how individuals play 
the game (Henrich, 2004). On average, dictators give 28% of their endowment to the 
other player (Engel, 2011). In higher stakes situations, their willingness to give is even 
further reduced. Women contribute more funds than men on average, and those of old age 
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were more likely to contribute all of their funds. When given a larger endowment, 
dictators are less likely to give nothing, but anonymity reduces participants’ willingness 
to give (Engel, 2011). In short, dictator game behavior is largely contextual and varies 
within individuals, populations and between populations depending on many outside 
factors.  
The public goods game measures the cooperative attitude of individuals toward 
their group (Camerer, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2011; Davis & Holt, 1993). The public goods 
game has a similar structure to the dictator game, with one major difference: instead of 
being asked to donate a portion of their funds to the next player, subjects are given the 
opportunity to donate to their group, after which the collective funds will grow and 
redistributed equally to each group member. In this study the collective fund grew by a 
factor of 1.4, although this multiplier varies among different studies.  
Interestingly, the results of this game often deviate from the anticipated norms. 
The Nash equilibrium is defined as the choice which maximizes the payout to all 
individuals. In the public goods game, this choice is a contribution of $0 to the group. 
This is rooted in the assumption that others will also contribute $0, since everyone is 
assumed to be a payoff-maximizer. Despite this logic, experiments often yield 
dramatically different results, with individuals contributing a large amount or even the 
entirety of their endowment to the group. This behavior illustrates cooperation at the 
group level, when individuals believe that others in the group will also be cooperative, 
otherwise known as conditional cooperation (Camerer, 2003). Although acting 
cooperatively produces group averages, the highest payoff for individuals can be 
achieved by giving zero while the rest of the group acts cooperatively and donates 
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heavily. In game theory, this behavior is know as free-riding. This free-ridership is an 
important concept in Hardin and Ostrom’s work, because the temptation to act selfishly is 
a constant threat to the equitable and sustainable management of the commons. On 
average, participants in public goods game experiments donate about 38% of their initial 
endowment to the group (Zelmer, 2003).   
By implementing both experimental games, this study was able to observe 
cooperation at multiple levels, with the dictator game expressing individual-individual 
cooperation and the public goods game demonstrating individual-group cooperation. The 
comparison between the two games results provides some indication of how cooperative 
these buying clubs are on multiple levels, in relation to one another, and in relation to 
those outside of the study population.  
Cooperation can also be measured in many other ways. Other studies have used 
measures of social cohesiveness of a group, or the level of connectedness that exists 
between members, to measure cooperation. Group identity has been assessed in surveys 
using Likert scales (Einolf, 2010; Heere & James, 2007; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), a 
method which was implemented in the present study of buying clubs (see question 55 in 
Appendix A). While group identity alone has not been found to have sufficient pull in 
determining cooperation, it has a much stronger effect when working in tandem with 
group consensus (Bouas & Komorita, 1996). The perception of consensus is a critical 
underlying factor in cooperation within a group, especially when the group faces a social 
dilemma as food buying clubs do by their very structure. Both social identity and 
consensus are measures observed in the current study of food buying clubs.  
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CHAPTER II 
2.1 – Hypotheses  
 
This thesis is a smaller component of a larger research program funded by NSF 
CAREER grant SES-1352361 to Dr. Timothy Waring. The goals of this project were to 
measure cooperation, observe the prevalence of Ostrom’s design principles, and to gain 
an understanding of member experience in and perceptions of buying clubs. An online 
survey of buying clubs was designed using Qualtrics survey software to answer some key 
research questions. Table 1 includes eight different hypotheses used to develop our 
survey, along with the supporting literature and corresponding questions.  
In this thesis, I address two of those hypotheses, H1 and H2. H2 is broken into 
two parts, one broad and another specific.  
 
H1: Buying clubs and food co-ops pose social dilemmas, requiring a high level of 
cooperation and other prosocial behaviors to function. 
 
H2: Institutional factors and other group-level effects create stronger groups, 
which in turn create stronger group-like behavior in individuals and increased 
prosociality.  
Sub-hypothesis: Experimental measures of social capital (cooperation, 
altruism, trust), measures of participation, and successful collective action 
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will be greater among members of purchasing cooperatives with more 
rules corresponding to the Ostrom design principles.  
H1 is tested in a comparison of average buying club donations in each experimental game 
(see Chapter III). H2 is tested using a quantitative analysis of measures of experimental 
cooperation and prevalence of institutional design principles (see Chapter IV). 
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Table 1. Central hypotheses and corresponding survey questions 
* See Appendix A for a full list of survey questions 
 
 
Hypothesis Literature Questions* 
1. Buying clubs and food co-ops pose social 
dilemmas, requiring a high level of cooperation 
and other prosocial behaviors to function. 
Ostrom (1990) 
Wilson (2008) 
13, 16, 20, 
23, 24, 26, 
28, 29, 31, 
50, 54, 56 
2. Institutional factors and other group-level 
effects create stronger groups, which in turn 
create stronger group-like behavior in 
individuals and increased prosociality. Sub-
hypothesis: experimental measures of social 
capital (cooperation, altruism, trust), measures 
of participation, and successful collective 
action will be greater among members of 
purchasing cooperatives with more rules 
corresponding to Ostrom’s design principles. 
Boone (2014) 
Anderson (2014) 
Engel (2011) 
Zelmer (2003) 
10, 11, 20, 
42, 50, 56 
3. Prosociality can be measured by 
characteristics of volunteer organizations 
including extensivity, generativity, altruism, 
moral obligation, etc. 
Einolf (2010) 
Chambré and Einolf (2008) 
McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) 
Sawyer (1966) 
43, 44, 45, 
46, 47, 50   
4. Being part of a group provides personal and 
social benefits including the formation of an 
identity. People may be more likely to develop 
altruistic behavior when they identify with the 
group. 
Murnighan (1993) 
Boone (2014) 
Einolf (2010) (social identity theory) 
Heere & James (2007) 
Luhtanen (1992) 
52, 55, 56  
5. Volunteerism is a form of (weak) altruistic 
behavior and is essential to the structure of 
these organizations. Prosocial behaviors may 
depend on organizational or personal rewards. 
Murnighan (1993) 
Hibbert et al. (2001) 
20, 21, 42, 
50, 53, 54 
 
6. Co-ops arise from a lack of access to desired 
goods, anti-corporate attitudes or potential 
corporate threat, or the presence of 
infrastructure to support a co-op. 
Boone (2014) 
Einolf (2010) 
39, 41 
7. Growth and expansion are necessary in order 
for co-ops to have lower average costs and to 
be competitive in economies of scale. Buying 
clubs can often serve as precursor groups to 
food co-ops. Is this an explicit goal of these 
clubs, or an option they’ve discussed? 
Cotterill (1983)  33, 35, 38, 54 
8. Many buying clubs receive support from co-
ops in their founding, making the relationship 
between buying clubs and co-ops one of 
interplay, collaboration and evolution.   
Ronco (1974) 34, 38, 49  
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2.2 – Survey Design and Implementation 
 
This survey was distributed to a population of buying clubs subscribed to Buying 
Club Software, Inc., an online service that helps buying clubs coordinate their orders. 
This service is owned and operated by Mr. Jeremy Bloom, who served as an important 
community partner to us during this research project. Over the course of our study, Mr. 
Bloom agreed to provide contact information for the buying club coordinators and helped 
to share our survey with the clubs. In return, the research team offered to report relevant 
findings to Mr. Bloom at the end of the study. To that end, the buying club survey 
included questions requesting users’ feedback on his service. We also worked with Mr. 
Bloom to offer a major incentive to participants of the survey. Clubs were informed that 
if they were able to reach 75% of active member participation, they would receive a 
discount of $100 off of their subscription to Buying Club Software. Funds from the NSF 
CAREER grant were used to reimburse Mr. Bloom for this incentive.  
The survey was distributed by an email campaign to the coordinators of eighteen 
buying clubs, who were informed of the project and asked to help distribute anonymous 
survey links to their club members (see Appendix C). Respondents were presented with a 
notice of informed consent before starting the survey, which explained the purpose of the 
study, the kinds of questions included in the survey, potential risks and benefits, 
compensation, confidentiality, voluntary participation, and researcher contact information 
(see Appendix A). These emails were later followed up with phone calls to establish a 
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relationship between the research team and club coordinators, boost participation and 
receive any feedback that coordinators or members may have wanted to share with the 
team. The clubs provided the necessary data for analysis and the research team will 
deliver key findings and relevant summary data to the clubs and to Jeremy at the end of 
the study. 
The survey contains two different sections: one designated for buying club 
members and one for buying club leaders and organizers. The member section has 42 
questions, including the two experimental economic games, buying club experience and 
participation, demographics and feedback on the quality of Buying Club Software’s 
service. A coordinator-specific section includes 28 additional questions that address 
buying club logistics and organization, rules, use of the institutional design principles 
(IDPs) and buying club history.  
 
2.3 – Experimental Game Methods 
 
The survey began with the dictator game, in which respondents were presented 
with an endowment of $8 and given the option to anonymously donate any whole-dollar 
amount of that sum to another anonymous member of the respondent’s buying club. The 
payout to respondents was calculated using the following formula: 
 
Formula 1. Dictator game payout calculation Compensation = 8 − contribution	to	recipient + donation	from	dictator	in	game	two	
 
 19 
Following one round of the dictator game, respondents were presented with one round of 
the public goods game. They were again provided with an $8 endowment, from which 
they had the option of donating any whole dollar amount to a collective fund for their 
buying club rather than a random individual in the club. Respondents were informed that 
those funds donated to the collective pool would be multiplied by 1.4 and distributed 
equally among all participatory members. Total individual compensation was equal to the 
sum of the compensation from each game.  
 
Formula 2. Public goods game payout calculation  
Compensation = 8 − contribution	to	group + 	∑	group	contributions	x	1.4number	of	group	members 	  
 
Following the games, participants were asked to select the option that best describes their 
role: buying club member or buying club leader or organizer. This is a sorting question 
that turned on or off the additional set of questions designed for buying club coordinators. 
All survey questions are provided in Appendix A.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
3.1 – Summary of Results 
 
This survey was launched on November 14th, 2016 and was open until March 1st, 
2017. A total of 92 participants responded, representing nine different clubs (see Table 
2). However, only seven of these clubs had high enough response rates to compare design 
principle implementation to member responses. The two clubs removed from this 
analysis provided a total of three responses, which were included in other analyses, such 
as those comparing experimental game outcomes.  
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Buying 
Club Survey Responses 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
* Includes both complete and partial responses 
 
 
Buying 
Club  
Member 
Responses* 
Coordinator 
Responses* 
A 7 1 
B 25 2 
C 13 1 
D 9 1 
E 6 1 
F 7 1 
G 10 1 
H 0 1 
I 1 1 
    Total = 92 
 21 
 
 
3.2 – Experimental Game Outcomes 
 
 
Table 3. Individual club dictator game descriptive statistics (in dollars) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Individual club public goods game descriptive statistics (in dollars) 
Club  Responses Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
A 8 5.50 6.00 2.78 2.00 8.00 
B 27 5.60 6.00 2.70 0.00 8.00 
C 14 6.00 8.00 2.60 2.00 8.00 
D 10 5.70 5.50 2.26 2.00 8.00 
E 7 5.14 6.00 3.02 0.00 8.00 
F 8 4.88 5.00 3.09 0.00 8.00 
G 11 4.09 4.00 2.88 0.00 8.00 
Average – 5.27 5.71 2.76 0.06 8.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Club Responses Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
A 8 5.00 4.00 2.83 0.00 8.00 
B 27 4.74 4.00 1.91 0.00 8.00 
C 14 5.21 4.00 1.93 3.00 8.00 
D 10 4.60 4.00 1.35 3.00 8.00 
E 7 3.86 4.00 0.90 2.00 5.00 
F 8 3.88 4.00 2.17 0.00 8.00 
G 11 4.91 4.00 2.01 2.00 8.00 
Average – 4.60 4.00 1.87 1.42 7.60 
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Figure 1. Mean contributions for each game by club 
 
 
Figure 2. Average donation among groups for each game 
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3.3 – Discussion of Experimental Game Outcomes 
 
The mean donation for all clubs was $4.60 (58% of total endowment) for the 
dictator game, and $5.27 (66% of total endowment) for the public goods game. In 
comparing the results of these experimental games with studies conducted on other 
populations, it is apparent that participants in the current study donated nearly twice the 
typical amount. Meta-analyses of these economic games have reported a 28% mean 
donation for the dictator game (Engel 2011) and a 38% mean donation for the public 
goods game (Zelmer 2003). In comparing these figures, our data show that buying club 
members donated on average 107% more than the typical amount in the dictator game, 
and 74% more in the public goods game. This comparison suggests a greater level of 
cooperation among the buying club members observed at present when compared to 
those outside of the study population.  
Buying club E donated the lowest average amount in the dictator game and is the 
only club that did not donate any amount greater than $5.00 in that game. This is 
significantly lower than the maximum donation for every other club, which was $8.00. 
Club E’s public goods game donations are much closer to those of the rest of the study 
population, suggesting that members of this group are more willing or likely to cooperate 
with the group as a unit than with unspecified other members.  
 Another interesting finding displayed in Tables 3 and 4 is the increased 
cooperation shown by buying clubs C and D. Neither of these clubs donated less than 
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$2.00 or $3.00 in the dictator or public goods games, respectively, where most other 
groups had at least one person donate $0.00. The average donations of groups C and D 
are consistently high, with similar standard deviations in each of the games. Through 
their game choices, these buying clubs are notably similar in their cooperative behaviors.   
 Generally, individuals donate more on average to public goods games than to 
dictator games (Engel 2011; Zelmer 2003). Buying club G stands out in these data as the 
only group that donated a greater amount of money to the dictator game than to the public 
goods game (see Figure 1), which is opposite of the anticipated outcome of these 
experimental games and contrasts with the results of all other clubs in the current study. 
This finding suggests that those in club G may be more cooperative with other members 
directly than with the group as a unit. Future exploration of this club’s survey responses 
may help explain this finding.  
 Figure 1 shows the total distribution of average donation amounts for both 
experimental games. As noted in Chapter I, dictator and public goods donations are 
generally not distributed normally. The anticipated distribution for these games shows a 
cluster of donations at the minimum (zero dollars), another at the median (four dollars) 
and one at the maximum (eight dollars). Figure 2 shows that the donations for the games 
in this survey are concentrated at the median and maximum amounts, with very few 
donations at the minimum. This may provide another suggestion that the study population 
observed in this research is more cooperative toward one another than the general public 
(Engel 2011; Zelmer 2003), which would support the broader hypothesis (H2) presented 
in Section 2.1. This and the other exploratory findings mentioned will be helpful in 
shaping the way the larger research project proceeds. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
4.1 – Summary of Quantitative Analysis 
 
Ostrom’s institutional design principles were derived from small communities 
that managed common pool natural resources such as fishing grounds and grazing 
pastures for livestock. The present study observes small voluntary organizations, which 
instead of managing a common pool natural resource, manage mutually beneficial “club 
goods” – the practice of collaborating to share food orders, and the social organization 
that supports that sharing. The following implementation of Ostrom’s design principles in 
the survey construction and analysis further expands upon the work of scientists who 
have applied the Ostrom principles in nontraditional contexts.  
The primary objectives of the initial exploration of the data obtained from the 
food buying club survey were to investigate the prevalence of Elinor Ostrom’s design 
principles within individual food buying clubs, and the extent to which the 
implementation of those principles influences cooperation among members of the clubs. 
In order to understand the relationship, if any, between the prevalence of buying club 
cooperation and the implementation of the design principles, a series of index variables 
were constructed using a handful of relevant survey questions. Indices for six individual 
design principles and an overall index were then compared to measures of cooperation in 
four regression analyses. These equations are listed in Table 6 along with the 
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corresponding design principles and survey questions created to measure the prevalence 
of the design principles.  
Elinor Ostrom produced a series of eight core design principles, as described in 
Chapter I of this thesis, but only the first six were implemented in this survey of food 
buying clubs. Principles seven and eight are less relevant to the study population at hand 
because they are concerned with group function as it relates to a larger system. Design 
principle seven, minimal recognition of rights to organize, ensures that individuals within 
groups can craft their own set of rules without facing oppressive or didactic treatment 
from higher authorities like government bodies. Principle eight, nested enterprises, is 
concerned with the consistent presence of the other principles at nested organizational 
levels and pertains more to complex and larger-scale CPRs. Given the context of this 
study, integration of principles seven and eight in the survey would prove difficult given 
the small niche market that buying clubs occupy. Additionally, the goals of this research 
project aligned more congruently with the first six principles, hence why they were 
chosen during survey design.  
Here, an index was calculated to represent the prevalence of each institutional 
design principle for each club. The indices range from 0 to 1, and are used to compute 
and overall index for the total prevalence of all institutional design principles in each 
club. This index represents a measure of the institutional rules and factors likely to secure 
cooperation within each club. 
 27 
Table 5. Design principle score index calculations 
 
The first design principle concerns the clarity of boundaries around the common 
resource (in this case access to the system of shared shopping) and those who can access 
it. Two questions in the survey addressed this principle: Question 23 asks, “are there any 
 Institutional Design Principle Questions Index Calculation 
1 Clearly defined boundaries: 
Individuals or households who have 
rights to withdraw resource units 
from the CPR must be clearly defined, 
as must the boundaries of the CPR 
itself. 
23, 24 Mean 
2 Congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local 
conditions: Appropriation rules 
restricting time, place, technology, 
and/or quantity of resource units are 
related to local conditions and to 
provision rules requiring labor, 
material and/or money. 
20, 50, 54 ∑HCHR S 
 
HC = Total hours contributed to club 
HR = Total hours required by club 
S = Percent of satisfaction with club 
3 Collective-choice arrangements: 
Most individuals affected by the 
operational rules can participate in 
modifying the operational rules. 
56 ∑R3n  
 
R = Response to question 56 
(given assignments of 0-3) 
 
4 Monitors, who actively audit CPR 
conditions and appropriator 
behavior, are accountable to the 
appropriators or are the 
appropriators. 
28 Mean 
 
5 Graduated sanctions: Appropriators 
who violate operational rules are 
likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions (depending on the 
seriousness and context of the 
offense) by other appropriators, by 
officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or by both. 
29 Mean 
6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms: 
Appropriators and their officials have 
rapid access to low-cost local arenas 
to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between 
appropriators and officials. 
31 Mean 
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criteria required to join your buying club? Question 24 asks, “are there any requirements 
for staying a member of the club? To calculate the score for this design principle, the two 
survey responses were averaged to produce an index, as noted in Table 5.   
Design principle two addresses a congruence between rules for contribution, or 
provision, and rules for individual benefit from group participation. Often, provision and 
appropriation rules within a group can be flexibly interpreted depending on the 
characteristics of the group. In the case of food buying clubs, provision can be defined by 
rules for hourly volunteer or paid contribution of work to the group, and was measured 
with questions 20 and 50. Individual benefit was measured with question 54. Question 20 
states, “Buying clubs usually need certain tasks to be done. On average, how many hours 
per week does each task require?” Question 50 asks, “How many hours per week, on 
average, do you do work tasks for the buying club?” Finally, question 54 asks, “In 
general, how happy or satisfied are you with your group?  
To calculate the total score for the second design principle, the sum of hours 
contributed to the club was divided by the total hours required, and then multiplied by the 
average satisfaction with the buying club. This formula captures the success of the buying 
club in two senses: ability to complete necessary work weighted by individual 
satisfaction to satisfy the congruence as described in Ostrom’s second principle.  
The third design principle is related to the ability of individuals to participate in 
group decision making. Because this principle is relatively straightforward, the survey 
asks a simple question that measures the amount of democratic participation that happens 
within each club. Question 56 asks, “As a member of this buying club, do you feel as 
though you have a say in all decisions being made?” The options for this question, with a 
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score of 0-3 assigned to each, are as follows: I don’t have any say (0), I have some say 
but not as much as others (1), I have equal say in what happens on some matters (2), and  
I have I have equal say in what happens on all matters (3). To calculate the overall score 
for this principle, the sum of these assignments was divided by the number of responses  
times three, which is the maximum score for each response. This formula provided a 
score ranging from 0-1 for each club.  
Design principle four is concerned with monitoring individual behavior within 
groups to ensure that members are held accountable for their actions that affect the CPR. 
In other words, it is a way to determine if the rules of the group need to be enforced. The 
coordinator survey contains one question that addresses this principle. Question 28 asks, 
“Does your club have a system for monitoring behavior among members? Options are 
yes or no, with a text box to describe any particular monitoring methods. To calculate the 
score, clubs were either given a 0 or 1, with 0 indicating no use of a monitoring system 
and 1 indicating the presence or use of such a system. In the present study, none of the 
clubs used a system to monitor member actions, so we have excluded this variable from 
the regressions. 
The fifth principle is also concerned with rule enforcement, but is more focused 
on disciplinary action. The survey includes design principle five in question 29 of the 
coordinator survey, which asks, “Are there consequences for breaking these rules?” as a 
follow-up to question 28 described above. The options for question 29 are yes or no, and 
the score for this principle was calculated in the same manner as design principle four, 
with 0 indicating no consequences, and 1 indicating the presence or implementation or 
consequences for rule-breaking.  
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The sixth and final design principle included in this survey is concerned with 
group ability to resolve conflicts in a productive and beneficial way. Question 31 of the 
coordinator survey asks, “Does the buying club have a standardized method for resolving 
conflicts?” The options for response are yes or no, and the score for this principle was 
calculated in the same manner as principles four and five, with 0 indicating no standard 
method and 1 indicating the presence or use of a conflict-resolution method. Because no 
clubs had a score of 1, we excluded this IDP from the analysis.  
To calculate the total, aggregated score for each club, a simple average of all of 
the individual scores was taken (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Calculated design principle scores of individual clubs 
Club IDP 1 IDP 2 IDP 3 IDP 5 Total IDP Score 
A 0 0.9 0.57 0 0.25 
B 1 0.66 0.64 0 0.38 
C 0.5 0.32 0.62 0 0.24 
D 0 0.85 0.83 0 0.20 
E 0.5 0.24 0.88 0 0.27 
F 1 0.32 0.57 1 0.40 
G 0 0.27 0.71 0 0.16 
Average score: 0.29 
 
4.2 – Statistical Analyses 
 
These data were analyzed using two statistical methods. First, a series of means 
tests cross-examining the average donation amounts of each group for the two 
experimental games were conducted. Though these data are discrete, the use of means 
tests, especially with ordinal data, is common (De Winter & Dodou 2010). Because these 
data are not normally distributed, we used a non-parametric Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon 
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Test. The purpose of these means tests was to observe any significant difference between 
donations across groups. The means tests did not yield any significant difference between 
group donations, as shown in Appendix D.  
The second method of statistical analysis implemented was a multi-level 
regression. Four versions of the regression were computed to examine both the dictator 
and public goods game donations and measuring those outcomes against the use of the 
Ostrom design principles within groups, while constituting for demographics. For each of 
the two games, the regressions observed both aggregated IDP scores (see Table 6) in 
relation to the game contributions, and individual IDP scores (indices shown in Table 5) 
in relation to game contributions. We model individual dictator game responses as a 
function of group level characteristics related to IDPs and individual characteristics. The 
results of these regressions are listed in Table 7. 
 
Formula 3. Regression formula 𝐷BC = 𝛼 + 𝜂′IDPJ + 𝛽′XB + 𝜖B 
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Table 7. Estimated coefficients (in dollars) 
Estimates 
Dictator Game Public Goods Game 
IDP  
Total 
IDP 
Individual 
IDP  
Total 
IDP 
Individual 
IDP Score -1.746553 – 3.341762 – 
IDP 1 – 0.09 – 0.91 
IDP 2 – 0.09 – 0.21 
IDP 3 – -2.07 – 1.46 
IDP 5 – -2.52** – -0.18 
Age -0.04* -0.03’ -0.05* -0.05’ 
Income 0.02** 0.02** 0.005 0.01 
# of 
dependents 
-0.27 -0.02 0.10 0.10 
R-squared 0.14 0.20 0.05 0.01 
F 3.67 3.47 1.96 1.15 
p-value 0.01’ 0.003* 0.11 0.35 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ’p < 0.1  
 
4.3 – Discussion of Quantitative Analysis Results 
 
As shown in Table 7, the only significant predictors of dictator game donations 
are IDP 5, age, and household income. Interestingly, the existence of design principle 5 
(graduated sanctions) is negatively associated with dictator game contributions. This is an 
unanticipated outcome, seemingly contradicting hypothesis H2. However, the effect for 
IDP 5 relies on a single coordinator answering a single yes answer on question 29. While 
this could be a truthful answer and real effect we are observing, this finding can only be 
supported with low certainty due to its reliance on a single data point.  
Age was negatively associated with donations in both economic games, showing 
some level of significance in each regression. This runs counter to the expected positive 
effect (Engel 2011). Income was positively associated with donations in the dictator 
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game, which also runs counter to the expected negative relationship (Piff, Kraus, Côté, 
Cheng, & Keltner, 2010).  
The models developed for the dictator game were significant at both the total and 
individual levels, as indicated by the respective p-values of 0.01 and 0.003. The models 
for the public goods game were not significant enough to express the relationship 
between the IDP scores and game donations, which is evident in their p-values. There are 
many potential reasons for the inadequacy of these models. The paucity of data gathered 
by the present study must be taken into account, which has almost certainly yielded some 
unanticipated results. There were only seven individual clubs with a total of nine 
coordinators and 76 members surveyed. In addition, there may be better ways to specify 
the model given these data.   
If the methods of analysis used in this study measured the IDPs accurately, the 
data observed at present do not suggest that the use of design principles in the food 
buying clubs surveyed has any significant impact on the strength of individual or group 
cooperation as measured by the experimental economic games. While it is entirely 
possible that the extent to which buying clubs utilize the principles is not significant 
enough to impact the cooperation of individuals or groups, as the data suggest, it would 
be difficult to determine without a larger study population and more accurate models to 
observe the potential relationship between design principle implementation and 
experimental measures of cooperation.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
5.1 – Conclusions 
 
This study found average dictator game contributions from the participating 
buying clubs to be nearly double that of average contributions from groups in other 
contexts, with 58% found in this study compared to Engel’s 28% (2011). The average 
public goods game donation found in this study was 66% of total endowment, which is 
nearly double that of typical donations of 38% found in other studies (Zelmer 2003). This 
comparison suggests elevated levels of cooperation among buying club participants when 
compared to other study populations, and provides support for H1. Scant support for H2 
was found, with the significance of one design principle’s influence on cooperation 
resting on a single data point. Age was associated negatively with giving in both games, 
and household income was associated positively with dictator contributions but had no 
effect on public goods game donations. Mean contributions for both experimental games 
greatly exceeded those observed in other study populations.  
 
5.2 – Next Steps 
 
The major goal of this thesis is to provide a preliminary, exploratory analysis of 
survey data generated by the ongoing study of food buying clubs, which is one 
component of a larger study of cooperation in the local food industry. Thus, 
recommendations for next steps are key deliverables of this project. The next step in 
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unpacking all of the data generated by the buying club survey is to summarize and 
interpret the remaining quantitative questions. Many of these transcend the scope of this 
thesis, and pertain to other hypotheses formulated in the study framework (see Table 1). 
Additionally, an assessment of the qualitative data needs to be generated. Coordinators 
who filled out the survey have provided some more detailed and lengthy responses that  
should be compiled and analyzed. Once the results unaddressed by this thesis are 
compiled and analyzed, a summary of meaningful findings should be crafted and  
 distributed to interested parties including the buying clubs that have participated in the 
study as well as Mr. Jeremy Bloom. The summarizing and reporting of key findings 
pertaining to these groups and Mr. Bloom is an important aspect of this  
stakeholder-driven research and is a top priority for the team following this exploratory 
study.   
Next, a reassessment of the role of institutional factors including the IDPs should 
take place, using the new findings to help refine the metrics used. Once the formulas have 
been improved upon, the models developed for the public goods game should be revised, 
as they were not identified as significant models of in the statistical analysis (see Table 
7).  
Beyond the regression results, this study has identified a number of interesting 
paths to be taken by further investigation. There are many ways to study cooperation 
among groups with these data – comparing design principle scores to experimental game 
donations is only one. There are some interesting findings discussed in Section 3.3 that 
point to similarities and differences between groups, outliers and general trends in the 
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data that could be more comprehensively analyzed. Some key questions for future 
investigation include: 
1) Why did buying club E have the smallest donation average for the dictator 
game, but typical donations for the public goods game? What 
characteristics make this club stand out from the others in the study?   
2) Why do buying clubs C and D seem to be more cooperative than the rest? 
Are there other similarities that these clubs possess that make them unique 
from the study population? 
3) Why does buying club G have a higher average donation to the dictator 
game than the public goods game? Do the club’s survey results express 
lower cooperation at the group level? 
 
Aside from these points, more investigation should be done which looks at 
volunteering to understand cooperation, reciprocity and weak altruism. A number of 
questions in the survey address this connection (see Table 1, H5). Understanding 
cooperation in terms of time committed to the club and perceived personal reward. 
Finally, more data would certainly enhance the findings of this research. The paucity of 
data available for analysis in this preliminary stage of research makes it difficult to truly 
understand what is happening in these clubs, but nonetheless provide some valuable 
insight that will help improve the next stages of research. Another round of survey 
distribution to more food buying clubs would allow the research team to dive deeper into 
the connection between Ostrom’s design principles and institutional cooperation. This 
Honors thesis has truly only scratched the surface.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A – Buying Club Survey 
 
Buying Club Software Survey 
 
 
Welcome to the Buying Club Survey    
    
Thank you giving your time to fill out this survey.    
 
The Food Club Project is a collaborative research group. We are searching for the best 
solutions to the challenges that food buying clubs face. Your responses will help us 
identify those solutions. We will share the survey results with you as soon as possible. 
We hope that the findings will help your group in some new and interesting ways. After a 
required University research statement, the survey proceeds as follows.      
 
Two paid economic games (2 min) Buying club experiences (10 min) Demographic 
information (3 min) We also have a special section for buying club coordinators (10 
min). All together, it should take between 15 and 25 minutes. We look forward to your 
input!      
                           
    - The Food Club Project team 
 
 
 
University of Maine Notice of Informed Consent 
You are invited to participate in a research project lead by professor Tim Waring and 
student researchers at the University of Maine. The project is a study of the challenges 
faced by food buying clubs, and the solutions that groups have discovered. You must be 
at least 18 years of age to participate.   
 
What Will You Be Asked to Do?   
You will be asked to play two economic games with real money provided by the 
researcher, some of which you will get to keep. You will also be asked to complete a 
survey about your experience with your food buying club. In total this should take 15 to 
30 minutes.   
 
Risks: The only risks to participating in this experiment are the time and inconvenience 
of participation.   
 
Compensation: The economic games provide monetary compensation ranging from $0 
to $35, depending on your choices in the game.    
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Confidentiality: Your responses will be treated confidentially, and will be encrypted for 
security. You will be anonymous to other players in the economic games. You will be 
asked to select your club ID from a list, and provide your email address so that we can 
compensate you. Email addresses, club IDs and personal identifying information will 
never be published, presented, or shared outside of the research team. Identifying 
information will be destroyed at the end of the project (~5 years). Summary data (key 
findings, trends, themes etc.) will be shared with Jeremy Bloom, and buying club 
participants, but no raw data will be shared.    
 
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to you. The research will benefit society by 
improving our understanding of food buying clubs and cooperation.   
 
Voluntary: Participation is voluntary. You may stop at any time. However, if you stop 
before the end of the survey we will not be able to calculate your payment, or pay you.   
 
Contact: If you have any questions about the research or its goals, please contact Afton 
Hupper at afton.hupper@maine.edu or (207) 691-1786 or Ethan Tremblay at 
ethan.tremblay@maine.edu or (207) 299-4975, or Dr. Waring at 
timothy.waring@maine.edu. Any questions about your rights as a participant may be 
directed to Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection of Human 
Subjects, Institutional Review Board (IRB), at gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu or by phone: 
(207) 581-1498.  
 
By continuing you signal that you understand the risks and benefits and agree to 
participate. 
 
 Economic Games      
 
• First you will play two separate economic games.  
• Your identity and responses will be completely confidential.  
• You will be anonymous to other players, and they will be anonymous to you. 
 
First Game      
 
You are playing with: another person in your buying club.      
1. You have an endowment of $8.      
2. You may choose to contribute any whole-dollar amount ($0 to $8) to the other 
player.   
3. You will be paid the amount you chose to keep.  
4. The other player will be paid the amount you chose to contribute to them. 
 
Q 10 Use the slider to indicate how much, if any, you will contribute to another person in 
your buying club. 
______ Dollars contributed  
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Second Game  
 
You are playing with the all other members of your buying club.         
1. You have an endowment of $8.    
2. You may choose to contribute any whole-dollar amount ($0 to $8) to a group 
fund.  
3. Every other player may choose to contribute to the group fund.  
4. The group fund will grow by 40%, then be divided equally between every 
member of the group, regardless of their individual contributions.   
5. You will be paid the amount you kept, plus your equal share of the final group 
fund.  
6. Every other player faces the same scenario as you. 
 
Q 11 Use the slider to indicate how much, if any, you contribute to your buying club's 
group fund. Remember, the group fund will be increased 40% and divided evenly 
between all members. 
______ Dollars contributed  
 
Thank you. Your choices have been recorded. We will calculate your payment once all 
responses are recorded. To make payment possible, you will be asked to provide your 
email address at the end of the survey. If you fail to complete the survey and provide a 
correct email address, we will be unable to pay you.   Next, we ask a series of questions 
on your experience with your buying club. 
 
Q 12 Which best describes your role in the buying club? 
m Member (participates in buying club orders)  
m Coordinator (facilitates or coordinates buying club business)  
 
Coordinators Section 
     
As a buying club coordinator, you have responsibilities and perspectives beyond those of 
an individual member. This section concerns your role and experiences as a coordinator, 
and has questions about the ordering process, club organization, and history.   
   
Ordering Process – we will start with how the buying club makes orders. 
 
Q 13 Has your buying club had problems with people not contributing to group work as 
they should, or people breaking the rules? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q 14 How frequently does your club usually place orders? Please enter the number of 
days between orders.  
 
Q 15 How many people typically participate in an order? 
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Q 16 About what percentage of purchases are typically shared among members? 
______ Percent of purchases shared  
 
Q 17 What amount of shared ordering would be best for the group? 
m More shared orders  
m The current amount  
m Fewer shared orders  
m Not sure  
 
Organization and Operation – please consider how your buying club operates. 
 
Q18 How does your club communicate? Select all that apply.  
q Email  
q Phone  
q Texting  
q Facebook  
q Other ____________________ 
 
Q 19 Your group uses Buying Club Software to organize orders.  What other tools do you 
use to organize your orders? Select all that apply. 
q Paper order lists  
q Offline spreadsheets (like Microsoft Excel)  
q Online spreadsheets (like Google Sheets)  
q Financial software (like Quicken, Quickbooks)  
q Other (please describe) ____________________ 
 
Q 20 Buying clubs usually need certain tasks to be done. On average, how many hours 
per week does each task require? 
______ Compiling and Submitting orders (a) 
______ Financial Bookkeeping (b) 
______ Communication & Member Management © 
______ Hosting deliveries (d) 
______ Hosting meetings (e) 
______ Contacting wholesalers (f) 
______ Task A (g) 
______ Task B (h) 
______ Task C (i) 
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Q 21 How do members share work tasks? If the coordinator shares the task with other 
members, indicate the total number of people sharing the task. 
______ Compiling and Submitting orders (a) 
______ Financial Bookkeeping (b) 
______ Communication & Member Management (c) 
______ Hosting deliveries (d) 
______ Hosting meetings (e) 
______ Contacting wholesalers (f) 
______ Task A (g) 
______ Task B (h) 
______ Task C (i) 
 
Q 22 Are any roles or tasks in the club compensated? If so, please explain which tasks or 
roles are compensated, and how. 
 
Q 23 Are there any criteria required to join your buying club?  
m No  
m Yes ---> Please list criteria to join:  ____________________ 
 
Q 24 Are there any requirements for staying a member of the club? 
m No  
m Yes ---> Please list membership requirements: ____________________ 
 
Q 25 Please list the three most important group decisions the buying club makes. For 
example, these might concern suppliers, scheduling, group work, changing rules, or other 
topics. 
Group Decision #1  
Group Decision #2  
Group Decision #3  
 
Q 26 How does the group make these important group decisions? 
m Leader / coordinator decides  
m Informal discussion  
m Vote (majority rule)  
m Consensus (action requires unanimity)  
m Other ____________________ 
 
Q 27 Please describe the three most important rules (guidelines or expectations) your 
group has. 
Rule 1 (a) 
Rule 2 (b) 
Rule 3 (c) 
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Q 28 Does your club have a system for monitoring behavior among members? 
m No  
m Yes ---> Please summarize monitoring system:  ____________________ 
 
Q 29 Are there consequences for breaking these rules? 
m No  
m Yes ---> Please list consequences: ____________________ 
 
Q 30 How often do conflicts between members arise? 
______ Frequency of conflicts 
 
Q 31 Does the buying club have a standardized method for resolving conflicts? 
m No (2) 
m Yes ---> Please summarize method for resolving conflicts:  
____________________ 
 
 Buying Club History – please tell us a little about how your buying club began, and how 
it has changed.  
 
Q 32 What year was your buying club was established? 
 
Q 33 When your buying club began, how many members did it have? 
 
Q 34 What resources were helpful in organizing the group initially? Check all that apply. 
q Experienced members (1) 
q Advice from non-members (2) 
q Written guidelines, advice or principles (3) 
q Other: (4) ____________________ 
 
Q 35 By how many many members has your buying club grown since it started? If your 
group has shrunk, use negative numbers. 
 
Q 36 Please comment on how your buying club has changed over time. 
order & delivery schedule (a) 
food preferences (b) 
shared purchases (c) 
division of work tasks (d) 
goals and motivations (e) 
group identity (f) 
 
Q 37 What has been your group's biggest challenge? 
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Q 38 What goals or plans does the group have for the future? 
 
Members Section – this section concerns your experiences as a buying club member.      
 
Ordering Practices – please consider your ordering practices. 
 
Q 39 What are your primary motivations for joining your buying club? Select all that 
apply. 
q To save money on food  
q To gain access to certain foods  
q To meet health and dietary preferences  
q To support local producers  
q To support good environmental practices 
q To support good social practices  
q To avoid industrialized food 
q To socialize with club members  
q Due to familiarity with buying clubs  
q Due to personal connection or invitation  
q Other ____________________ 
q Other ____________________ 
q Other ____________________ 
 
Q 40 How often do you place an order with your buying club? 
______ Weeks  
 
Q 41 What percent of your total household needs are met through your buying club? 
______ % of needs met  
 
Q 42 People in buying clubs often split big, bulk purchases. Considering these split 
purchases: 
______ How often do you split a purchase to help someone else? (a) 
______ How often do other people split a purchase to help you? (b) 
 
Food Preferences – this section concerns how your buying club fulfills your food 
preferences. 
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Q 43 Please select the types of foods that you purchase through the buying club. (Select 
all that apply) 
q organic (a) 
q fair trade (b) 
q non-GMO (c) 
q sustainably sourced (d) 
q rare, ethnic or specialty foods (e) 
q local food (f) 
q other (g) ____________________ 
q other (h) ____________________ 
 
Q 44 What percentage of the items you purchase are sourced locally? 
______ % of local  
 
Q 45 What percent of items you purchase are organic, fair trade, or sustainably sourced? 
______ % organic, fair trade, sustainable 
 
Q 46 How expensive are these organic, fair trade, or sustainably sourced items compared 
to conventional items? 
 
 Much less 
expensive 
(1) 
Less 
expensive 
(2) 
About the 
same (3) 
More 
expensive 
(4) 
Much more 
expensive 
(5) 
Relative 
cost (1) m  m  m m  m  
 
 
Q 47 If you purchase organic, fair trade, or sustainably sourced items, please explain your 
personal reasons. 
 
Q 48 Have your food preferences or habits changed due to your experience in the buying 
club? Please explain. 
 
Participation – this section focuses on your participation in the buying club. 
 
Q 49 Please consider your connections to other buying clubs, food coops, or related 
groups. (Select all that apply.) 
q Do you have personal experience with a similar group (e.g. buying club, food 
coop, etc.)? (a) 
q Did you learn from someone with experience in a similar group? (b) 
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Q 50 How many hours per week, on average, do you do work tasks for the buying club? 
(Work tasks might include hosting deliveries, financial bookkeeping, etc.) 
 
Q 51 What work tasks have you done, and what roles have you occupied in the buying 
club? 
 
Q 52 Please rank the accuracy of the following statements in terms of how your group 
functions. 
______ My group communicates well. (a) 
______ Members contribute a fair share of the work. (b) 
______ Each member benefits equally from participating in the group. (c) 
______ Group members share purchases when needed. (d) 
______ My group functions well overall. (e) 
 
Q 53 Please reflect on the various costs and benefits of participating in the buying 
club.  Participating... 
______ ... benefits me financially. (a) 
______ ... costs me financially. (b) 
______ ... benefits me socially. (c) 
______ ... costs me    socially. (d) 
______ OVERALL: Participation benefits outweigh costs. (e) 
 
Q 54 In general, how happy or satisfied are you with your group? 
______ Level of satisfaction  
 
Q 55 Please rank the accuracy of the following statements in terms of your buying club. 
______ I have a strong sense of belonging to the buying club. (a) 
______ When I talk about the buying club, I usually say "we" rather than "they." (b) 
______ When someone praises the buying club, it feels like a personal compliment. (c) 
______ What happens to the buying club will have an impact on my own life. (d) 
______ The needs and wants of other members of the buying club influence my needs 
and wants. (e) 
______ The buying club requires effort from all members to function. (f) 
______ I interact with other buying club members frequently. (g) 
______ Being a member of the buying club is a major factor in my social relationships. 
(h) 
______ I am active in other organizations that include mostly members of the buying 
club. (i) 
 
Q 56 As a member of this buying club, do you feel as though you have a say in all 
decisions being made? (i.e. changes in suppliers, goals, rules, etc.) 
m Yes, I have an equal say in what happens on ALL matters (a) 
m Yes, I have an equal say on SOME matters (b) 
m Yes, I have some say but not as much as others (c) 
m No, I don't have any say (d) 
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Q 57 Is there anything you wish your group could do better? Please be specific. For 
example, communication, shared purchases, members, hours contributed, organization, 
etc. 
 
Demographic Information – the basic information provided in this section will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
 
Q 58 Please select your age. 
m 18  
m 19  
m …up to 100 
 
Q 59 What is your gender? 
m Male  
m Female  
m Prefer not to say  
 
Q 60 Please describe your ethnicity by selecting all that apply.  
q White  
q Black or African American  
q Latino / Latina  
q American Indian or Alaska Native  
q Asian 
q Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
q Prefer not to say 
q Other  
 
Q 61 Please select your highest completed education level. 
m Some high school  
m High school diploma or GED  
m Some college or an associate's degree  
m Bachelor's degree 
m Master's or professional degree  
m PhD, JD, MD, etc.  
 
Q 62 What is your approximate annual household income? 
______ Approximate annual household income (in thousands)  
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Q 63 Please select your employment status. 
m Employed full time  
m Employed part time  
m Unemployed looking for work  
m Unemployed not looking for work  
m Self-employed/work from home  
m Homemaker  
m Retired  
m Student  
m Disabled  
 
Q 64 How many people are in your household? 
 
Q 65 How many earners are in your household? 
 
Q 66 How many dependents are in your household? 
 
Buying Club Software   
 
Please consider how your group uses BuyingClubSoftware.com to organize shared 
orders. Your responses here will help improve BuyingClubSoftware. 
 
Q 67 How satisfied are you with the service provided by BuyingClubSoftware? 
______ Satisfaction  
 
Q 68 How could BuyingClubSoftware improve its service? 
 
Q 69 What do you appreciate about BuyingClubSoftware now? 
 
Q 70 Payment Details    
 
One last step... electronic payment! We use a free service called Square Cash to send 
your games payments electronically.   
 
Square Cash Details:  
- Square Cash is secure, fast, and will deposit the payment into your bank 
account.  
 - You will need a current debit card to accept the payment.   
- You will receive an email from cash@square.com, with a link to accept the 
payment.  
- You will have 14 days to accept the payment.  
- The deposit will appear on your bank statement as “SQC*WARING” or 
“SQ*WARING”. Please enter your email address below so we can send you your 
payment: 
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You're all done!       
 
Thank you.    
 
Your answers will help us better understand the best solutions buying clubs have found to 
their hardest challenges. Once everyone has been able to complete the survey and games, 
and we have analyzed them all, we will share the survey results with you and your club. 
We hope that the findings will be interesting and useful!    
 
Don't Forget:    
 
**Look for an email from cash@square.com with instructions to accept your games 
payment!** 
 
  - The Food Club Project Team 
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Appendix B – Institutional Review Board Approval of research with human subjects 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
 
TO:  Timothy Waring 
  200 Winslow Hall 
 
FROM: Gayle Jones 
 Assistant to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human 
Subjects (IRB) 
 
SUBJECT: “Investigating the Role of Cooperation Among Food Buying Clubs and 
Cooperatives,” #2016-08-09 
 
DATE: October 26, 2016 
 
 
 The above referenced project was approved by the University of Maine’s 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB) in an expedited 
review.  The approval period is 10/25/2016 through 10/24/2017.  A continuing review of 
this project must be conducted by the IRB before the end of the approval period.  
Although you will receive a request for this information approximately 6-8 weeks before 
that date, it is your responsibility to submit the information in sufficient time to allow for 
review before the approval period expires. 
 
 Attached is an approved copy of the consent document for this project.  The 
approval for this consent expires on 10/24/2017.  Please be sure the approval 
information found on the bottom is added to the version you post.  The Board waived 
the requirement for signed consent under Section I.K.3.b. of the Policy. 
 
 Please remember that any proposed changes to the research must be approved by 
the IRB prior to implementation.  If you have questions, please contact me at 1-1498.  
Thank you.   
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Appendix C – Emails to Buying Clubs 
 
1. Launch Email 
 
SUBJECT: The Buying Club Survey 
 
Dear COORDINATOR, 
I am an honors student working on the Food Club Project with professor Tim Waring at 
the University of Maine and Jeremy Bloom of BuyingClubSoftware.com. Over the past 
several months we have carefully designed a survey to discover the practices that make 
buying clubs most successful. Your feedback in this survey will help us identify those 
solutions and practices. We will share the survey results with you as soon as possible, and 
we are hopeful that they will help your group in some concrete and interesting ways. 
 
The survey includes two paid economic experiments and will take only 15 - 30 minutes. 
Could you please help make sure everyone in your group takes the survey? 
 
Here is the link: 
The Buying Club Survey: Group Name 
 
Thank you so much! 
 
If you would like to learn more about the Food Club Project, please feel free to contact 
me at afton.hupper@maine.edu, by phone (207-691-1786), or visit our website. 
Sincerely, 
 
Afton Hupper 
Honors Student, Sustainable Food Systems 
 
And the rest of the team…. 
Jeremy Bloom (BuyingClubSoftware.com) 
Tim Waring (Associate Professor, University of Maine) 
Ethan Tremblay  (Masters Student, Economics) 
Taylor Lange (PhD Student, Environmental Science) 
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2. Reminder Email 
 
 
SUBJECT: Happy New Year from the Food Club Project! 
 
Dear COORDINATOR, 
 
Happy new year to CLUB NAME from the Food Club Project at UMaine. We study 
buying clubs, and our survey helps clubs learn what makes them unique, and makes it 
easy to learn from other clubs. 
 
Thank you! 
Thanks for distributing the survey to CLUB NAME buying club. The responses so far 
hint at some interesting results we look forward to sharing with you. But, so far, only 
PERCENT% of your club has completed the survey - not enough for clear conclusions. 
The more people complete it, the stronger the results will be. So, we are opening the 
survey again for one month in 2017. Can you please help encourage everyone in your 
group to complete the survey? Here’s the link: 
 
[CLUB SURVEY LINK] 
Survey link for [CLUB] members & coordinators only. 
 
As a reminder, the survey: 
 
• Is built to help buying clubs. We share our results with clubs that take the survey. 
• Includes a paid economic game. Payments up to $35, depending on your choices. 
• Is short. Although comprehensive, the survey takes only 15 to 25 min. 
• Is good for your club. If 75% of your club finishes the survey, you get $100 off 
BuyingClubSoftware.com. 
• Is confidential. We are a non-profit, grant-funded research team. We don’t share any 
of your personal information with third parties. 
 
Please let us know if you have any problems or questions! We are here to help, and we 
would be happy to chat, and answer any questions.  
 
Again, thank you, and happy 2017! 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Afton Hupper (Honors Student, University of Maine) 
And the Food Club Project Research Team 
afton.hupper@maine.edu 
(207) 691-1786 
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Appendix D – Means Tests 
 
Table 8. Differences in mean dictator game donations between groups (in dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Differences in mean public goods game donations between groups (in dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Club A B C D E F G 
A – – – – – – – 
B 0.26 – – – – – – 
C 0.21 0.47 – – – – – 
D 0.40 0.14 0.61 – – – – 
E 1.15 0.89 1.36 0.75 – – – 
F 1.13 0.87 1.34 0.73 0.02 – – 
G 0.10 0.16 0.31 0.30 1.05 1.03 – 
Club A B C D E F G 
A – – – – – – – 
B 0.05 – – – – – – 
C 0.50 0.44 – – – – – 
D 0.20 0.14 .30 – – – – 
E 0.36 0.41 .85 .56 – – – 
F 0.63 0.68 1.13 .83 .27 – – 
G 1.41 1.46 1.91 1.61 1.05 .78 – 
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